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THE CURIOUS CASE OF GREENING IN CARBON MARKETS
BY
WILLIAM BOYD* & JAMEs SALZMAN**

Over the last several years, so-called carbon markets have
emerged around the world to facilitate trading in greenhouse gas
credits. This Article takes a close look at an unexpected and
unprecedented development in some of these markets-premium
"green" currencies have emerged and, in some cases, displaced
standard compliance currencies. Past experiences with other
environmental compliance markets, such as the sulfur dioxide and
wetlands mitigation markets, suggest the exact opposite should be
occurring Indeed, buyers in such markets should only be interestedin
buying compKance, not in the underlyingenvironmentalintegrity of the
compliance unit. In some of the compliance carbon markets,however,
ugher qualitygreen creditshave emerged in recentyears as important
currencies for a number of buyers, representing a dynamic that we
refer to as "Gresham's Law in reverse -more stringent currencies
arisingalongside and even displacinginferior currencies. This Article
provides the flrst recognition and analysis of green differentiation in
carbon markets. We explore a range of explanationsfor this curious
development. We then identify potential lessons for the design and
evolution of future carbon markets and,more generally environmental
compliance markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, Hungary made news in the climate change world when it
announced the sale of six million greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction credits to
Spain, the largest sale in the world at that time.' .The fact that Hungary was
selling emissions credits (known as Assigned Amount Units or AAUs) to
Spain was not surprising, nor was its earlier sale of two million credits to
Belgium.' As members of the European Union (EU), Spain and Belgium have
committed under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto, or Protocol) to
reducing their GHG emissions eight percent below 1990 revels by 2012, 3 and
this reduction can be met by a combination of both actual emissions
reductions and the purchase of emission reduction credits.
What was surprising was the sales strategy of Hungary. It proclaimed
that its reduction credits were especially valuable because the funds raised
by the sale would be invested in energy efficiency projects in residential and
public sector buildings rather than simply going into the national treasury to
be used on roads, pensions, or some other general need. 4 Nor was Hungary's
strategy unique. Over the past three years, Ukraine, the Czech Republic,
Latvia, Poland, and other eastern and central European countries have
announced similar transactions.
. These all have been described as so-called "Green Investment Scheme"
(GIS) deals.6 GIS is a self-imposed commitment by potential seller countries

1 See Michael Szabo, Spain Buys 6 Million Emissions Rights from Hungary,REUTERS, Nov.
13, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AC50420081113.
2 See id
3 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,

art. 3, 1, annex B, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 214.
4 See Szabo, supra note 1.

5 Andreas Tuerk et al., Green Investment Schemes. FirstExperiencesand Lessons Learned

31 tbl.4 (Central European University Center for Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Policy
and Joanneum Research, Working Paper, 2010) (reviewing GIS efforts in 11 central and eastern
European countries). The largest transaction to date has been the Czech Republic's 2009 sale of
40 million AAUs to Japan. Id.
6 See WILLIAM BLYTH & RICHARD BARON, OECD ENV'T DIRECTORATE & INT'L ENERGY AGENCY,
GREEN INVESTMENT SCHEMES: OPTIONS AND ISSUES 7 (2003) ("The purpose of Green Investment
Schemes (GIS) is to promote the environmental efficacy of transfers of excess AAUs, by
earmarking revenues from these transfers for environmentally-related purposes in the seller

countries. This should act to improve the marketability of AAUs from some seller countries."
(citation omitted)); A.ExEY KOKORIN, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND CLIMATE CHANGE
KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, GREEN INVESTMENT SCHEMES AS A WAY OF PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTALLY-
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that the income generated from sale of their credits will go to environmental
projects.7 There has been a comparable development in the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) market, where an increasing number of
certified emissions reductions (CERs) are held out as meeting a "Gold
Standard" of exceptional environmental quality. 8
It is important to note that these markets for "green" AAUs and CERs
are not mandated by the Kyoto Protocol. Nascent and still developing, they
are entirely voluntary creations with no regulatory oversight. The problem is
that this shouldn't be happening, not if past experience with other
environmental compliance markets is any guide.
Differential "greening" would be perfectly understandable in the
development of voluntary markets such as organic produce or paper with
recycled content. Here, green consumers are explicitly buying
environmental integrity but have difficulty choosing among competing
products.! To meet this need, information intermediaries such as standards
and certification bodies or rating agencies emerge to resolve questions of
trust and quality and to fill gaps due to lack of regulatory oversight.'" Put
simply, these bodies ensure that buyers know what they are getting when
faced with a range of purchasing options.
But regulatory markets, such as those created by the Kyoto Protocol, are
very different from those for organic produce or recycled paper. These are
entirely artificial markets created by law with one product for salecompliance credits. Belgium and Spain surely are not green consumers. As
rational economic actors, they and other buyers in these markets should simply
be concerned about the cost of compliance-whether they have enough
emissions reduction credits to meet their Kyoto obligations at low cost. This
has certainly been the case in other environmental compliance markets.
Classic pollution reduction markets, such as the Clean Air Act's" sulfur
dioxide (SOs) 2 and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) markets, 3 and resource
allocation markets, such as individual transferable quota schemes in

SOUND COOPERATION AMONG RussiA, CANADA, JAPAN AND OTHER NATIONS UNDER THE KYOTO

PROTOCOL 2 (2003).
7 See BLYTH & BARON,supra note 6, at 7; KOKORIN, supranote 6, at 2.
8 See Press Release, Gold Standard Foundation, Introducing the Gold Standard,
availableathttp://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmineditors/files/1-c munuicatiornL/handout/

GS in brief.pdf; see also Kelly Levin et al., Can Non-State CertificationSystems BolsterStateCentered Efforts to Promote Sustainable Development Through the Clean Development
Mechanism?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 777, 783-88 (2009) (describing the Gold Standard and its
relationship to the CDM).

9 See generaLly Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity Regulation: Nudging Consumers
Towards Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing Claims, 40 ENVTL L. 1327 (2010)
(discussing eco-labeling and environmental marketing regulation).
10 Id at 1366.
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
12 See id.§ 765 lb (establishing SO,, allowance trading program).
13 See id § 7671f (establishing allowance trading program for class I and class II ozone
depleting substances). Chlorofluorocarbons are class I ozone depleting substances. Id § 7671a.

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

[Vol. 41:73

fisheries,'4 have not tended toward any sort of greening or voluntary
differentiation. Nor have offset markets such as wetlands mitigation banking
or species banking, even though issues of quality and fungibility are
notoriously problematic in these markets.'5 In all of these environmental
markets and many more, the trading currency has remained unchanged and
unchallenged-whether a kilogram of fish or a ton of pollutant. Unlike
apples or oranges, there has been one and only one purchasing option. How
sustainably the fish was caught or emission reduction achieved has been
irrelevant and will likely remain so. Regulated parties want compliance or
access to the resource at lowest cost, period. Yet this is not happening in the
Kyoto markets. Something else is going on.
To understand carbon markets, then, we need to understand why green
differentiation is happening when least expected. Why is Gresham's Law'
occurring in reverse-superior currencies emerging alongside and, in some
cases, driving out cheaper currencies? Explaining this development requires
that we examine the role of governments as market participants and
understand the political economy driving government decision-making in
these markets.
Our central thesis is that carbon markets operate quite differently when
governments are major players. This raises obvious questions about market
design, whether one might expect to see similar greening dynamics in
markets involving private actors, and the evolution of future carbon
markets. Indeed, contrary to Gresham's Law, it seems quite likely that the
premium "green" currencies currently emerging in the Kyoto compliance
markets will lead to tighter rules and higher compliance standards for future
carbon markets at international, regional, and national levels.
Part I provides a general overview of the carbon markets, highlighting
the differences between the voluntary carbon markets and the compliance
carbon markets. Part III discusses the most important environmental
integrity concerns that have arisen in compliance carbon markets, in
particular the so-called "hot air" problem from over-allocation of emissions
allowances under the Kyoto Protocol and lack of additionality associated
with certain CDM projects. Part IV considers the lessons from other
environmental compliance markets, demonstrating the lack of any green
differentiation in these markets. Part V contrasts these experiences with the
14 COLIN W. CLARK, THE WORLDWIDE CRISIS IN FISHERIES: ECONOMIC MODELS AND HUMAN

BEHAVIOR 23 (2006).
15 See Deborah Fleischer & Jessica Fox, The Pitfalls and Challenges, in CONSERVATION &
BIODIVERSITY BANKING: A GUIDE TO SETTING UP AND RUNNING BIODIVERSITY CREDIT TRADING

SYSTEMS 43, 43-44 (Ricardo Bayon et al. eds., 2008); Dustin J. Edwards, Wetland Mtlgation
Banking. Is the Current System Beyond Repair?, 16 TUL. ENVrL. L.J, 445, 457-59 (2003)
(discussing wetlands mitigation).
16 Gresham's Law holds that under certain circumstances "bad money" will drive "good
money" out of circulation. See generally Frank Whitson Fetter, Some Neglected Aspects of
Gresham 's Law, 46 Q. J. ECON. 480 (1932) (providing overview of development and application
of Gresham's Law); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodlilcatlon of
EnvironmentalLaw, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 637, 665 (2000) (discussing Gresham's Law in context
of environmental trading markets).
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evolution of greened carbon credits in the Kyoto markets. Part VI offers a
range of explanations for these developments and Part VII explores lessons
this experience offers for the future of carbon markets.
II. CARBON MARKETS 101
The theory of emissions trading rests on the premise that reduction and
sequestration of GHGs across different sectors, activities, and geographies
7
can be made fungible and therefore amenable to trading.' Because GHG
emissions are global and well-mixed in the atmosphere, it should not matter
from an atmospheric standpoint where the reductions (or sequestrations)
occur. 8 Put more crudely, under the standard economic approach to GHG
emissions trading, a "ton is a ton is a ton" regardless of whether it comes
from a reforestation project in Tanzania, an industrial gas destruction

9
project in China, or reductions at a coal-fired utility in Germany.' In theory,

this fungibility enables "where and when flexibility" with respect to GHG
emissions reductions and sequestration activities, thereby allowing
mitigation efforts to proceed in the context of a robust market instrument at
20
the lowest marginal cost. This premise provides the foundation for the so-

called carbon markets,2' which are designed to allow trading of emissions
reduction

and sequestration credits from various activities in

various

17 See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER & WILLIAM A. PIZER, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 7-9 (2006) (discussing emissions trading and other policy instruments for

reducing greenhouse gas emissions).
18 Id. at 11.
19 While emissions trading rests on the premise that all reductions or sequestrations can be
made fungible, the emergence of green differentiation in carbon markets illustrates the
difficulties of ensuring commensurability. See infra Part V; see also William Boyd, Ways of
Seeingin Environmental Law: How DeforestationBecame an Object of Climate Governance,37
ECOLOGY L. Q. 843, 891-98, 911-15 (2010) (discussing challenges of commensurability in
translating forest carbon into compliance carbon and general problem of equivalence in
environmental law); Donald MacKenzie, Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and
the Politics of Carbon Markets, 34 AcCT., ORGS. & Soc'Y 440, 440 (2009) (analyzing how
commensurability is established between emissions reductions activities and the role of such
commensurability in providing "conditions of possibility" for emerging carbon markets); Michel
Callon, Civilzing Markets: Carbon TradingBetween in vitro and in vivo Experiments,34 ACCT.,
ORGS. & Soc'Y 535, 540 (2009) (discussing the establishment and stabilization of "equivalences"
between different greenhouse gases as a critical prerequisite for economic valuation and the
functioning of carbon markets); Peter Levin & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Pollution Futures:
Commensuration, Commodifcation,and the Marketfor Air in ORGANIZATIONS, POLICY, AND THE
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES (Andrew J. Hoffman &
Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002) (examining the role of "commensuration" in creating tradable
pollution permits and sustaining market-based approaches to air pollution control); Salzman &
Ruhl, supra note 16, at 609-15 (discussing challenges of establishing fungibility in
environmental markets).
20 Note the related issue of temporal ("when") flexibility of emissions reductions given
the long residence times of carbon dioxide (CO,) and other GHGs in the atmosphere. See
GOULDER & PIZER, supra note 17, at 11 (discussing "where" and "when" flexibility associated
with GHG emissions trading systems).
21 We use the phrase "carbon markets" as shorthand for GHG markets.
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places as a means of ensuring that overall reductions occur at the lowest
possible cost.H
Based on this foundation, today's carbon markets come in two main
flavors: voluntary and compliance. In the voluntary markets, buyers and
sellers trade carbon offsets of various types for the purpose of offsetting the
emissions associated with a particular activity. Many, but not all, of the
buyers of voluntary offsets are interested primarily in the reputational
benefits that come from offsetting a portion of their emissions, and thus
want some assurance that the purchased offsets have environmental
integrity.n But because of the high information costs of establishing such
integrity on a case-by-case basis, multiple information intermediaries have
emerged in the form of standards bodies for the purpose of ensuring the
credibility of offsets sold in the voluntary markets, including, for example,
the Voluntary Carbon Standard, 4 the Climate Action Reserve, 25 and the
Chicago Climate Exchange. 2 Some of these standards maintain their own
registries and issue their own units. Several have developed extensive
rulebooks, protocols, and methodologies for project accounting, reporting,
and verification.27 Outside of basic consumer protection laws, there is very
little regulation of the voluntary carbon markets. Some have described these
markets as a wild west, buyer-beware environment.8
The size of the voluntary carbon markets, in value and volume, has
grown significantly over the last decade, but is still quite small when
compared to the compliance markets. In 2009, total market volume was
around 87 million tons and total value was around $388 million. 29

22 Obviously, designing and operationalizing such a market is quite challenging, particularly
as the number of GHGs, sectors, and activities included within the market increase. This Article
does not address these broader market design challenges.
23 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY GREENHOUSE GAS RESEARCH & DEv. PROGRAMME,

VOLUNTARY

CARBON OFFSETS 17 (2008), available at http://www.ieaghg.org/docs/general-publications
Carbon%200ffsetsweb.pdf. Some buyers are also likely interested in gaining experience in the
carbon markets as they prepare for emerging compliance markets. Id
24 See Voluntary Carbon Standard, About the VCS, http://www.v-c-s.org/about.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2011).
25 See Climate Action Reserve, Program, http://www.climateactionreserve.org/how/
program/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
26 See Chicago Climate Exchange, Climate Change Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex
.com/indexjsf (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
27 See ANJA KOLLMUSS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF CARBON OFFSET PROGRAMS: TRADING SYSTEMS,
FUNDS, PROTOCOLS AND STANDARDS 5-6 (2010) (providing overview of various voluntary
offset standards).
28 Eg., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34241, VOLUNTARY CARBON
OFFSETS: OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 11 (2009); Neal Dikeman, EcoSecurities Founder Says
Carbon Markets Work; GREEN TECH BLOG (May 19, 2008, 11:53 AM), http://news.cnet.com/830111128_3-9947454-54.html.
29 This figure includes both project-based voluntary market transactions and transactions
under the Chicago Climate Exchange, which functions more like an allowance market.
ALEXANDRE KOSSOY & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON
MARKET 2010 at 1 tbl.1 (2010).
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The compliance markets, in contrast, are much larger (about $143
3
billion in 2009) and operate at multiple levels. 0 At the "global" level, the
Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms-emissions trading, Joint
Implementation (JI), and the CDM-constitute a Kyoto compliance market,
where specific Kyoto units (AAUs, CERs, emission reduction unit (ERUs),
and removal units (RMUs)) are traded and ultimately used by the Annex B
1
parties to demonstrate compliance with their Kyoto reduction targets
Within the Kyoto compliance market, there is an important distinction
between trading of emissions allowances (AAUs issued to the parties based on
their initial "assigned amounts") and project-based offset credits (CERs or
32
ERUs issued under the CDM or JI) that can be used for compliance purposes.
Underneath the Kyoto market, there are regional and national
compliance markets that operate primarily as mechanisms intended to help
certain Kyoto parties meet their Kyoto obligations. The largest of these is the
EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (2009 value of about $118 billion),
which provides the primary Kyoto compliance mechanism for the EU
Member States.' The EU ETS began operations in 2005, with a first trial
phase running through 2007." Phase II matches the first Kyoto commitment
period (2008-2012), and the EU has committed to a Phase 111 (2013-2020)

30 Id
31 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,

supra note 3, art. 17 (establishing emissions trading mechanism), art. 6 (establishing joint
implementation mechanism), art. 12 (establishing CDM mechanism); see also U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KYOTO PROTOCOL REFERENCE MANUAL ON ACCOUNTING OF
EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED AMOUNT 11, 15-18 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/

publications/08_unfccc kp-ref manual.pdf [hereinafter KYOTO REFERENCE MANUAL] (describing
different flexible mechanisms and various Kyoto units used under the different mechanisms).
32 See KYOTO REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 31, at 13-14, 17 (noting that under Kyoto each
Annex B Party is assigned a total emissions target relative to its 1990 baseline, and that the
quantity of the initially assigned amount is broken into AAUs, each of which represents an
allowance to emit one metric tonne of CO2 equivalent (tCO 2e)). By permitting trading of AAUs
among the Annex B Parties, the Kyoto Protocol allows these Parties to choose between making
emissions reductions at home or buying allowances to cover part of their compliance
obligations. In addition to AAU emissions trading, the Protocol's JI mechanism allows an Annex
B Party to invest in an emissions reduction or sequestration projects in other Annex B Parties
and receive credits--ERUs--that can then be used to meet the buyer's Kyoto compliance
obligation. Id Under the CDM mechanism, an Annex B Party can buy compliance creditsCERs-from projects in non-Annex B Parties. Id.
33 See KosSOY & AMBROSI, supra note 29, at 5 (providing data on size of the EU ETS relative
to other carbon markets); David M. Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel Governance, 19 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 389, 392 (2009) (noting that the EU chose to use emission trading as the main
mechanism for complying with the Kyoto Protocol).
34 See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October
2003 Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the
Community and Amending Council Directive 9616JiEC, arts. 10, 11(1), 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 36;
see also A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S EMISSION TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE iii (2008), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf (noting that the EU
ETS began in 2005 with a trial phase that ran through 2007).
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regardless of what happens in the international climate negotiations.5 In
contrast to Kyoto, which applies to governments, the EU ETS covers private
sector entities (more than ten thousand installations in major energy and
industrial sectors across the twenty-seven participating jurisdictions). 3
These covered entities are allowed to tender three units for compliance
purposes: emissions allowances (EUAs) and certain types of CERs and
ERUs issued under the CDM and JI Kyoto mechanisms.n
Outside of Kyoto, there are several other existing and emerging
compliance markets at the subnational level. The Australian state of New
South Wales and the Canadian province of Alberta both operate their own
provincial-level compliance systems.8 In the United States, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which went live in 2009, operates a capand-trade system for carbon dioxide (CO2 ) in the power sector in ten midAtlantic and Northeastern states, and allows for the trading of emissions
allowances and offsets subject to its own particular rules. 6 California is
moving toward the adoption of a cap-and-trade system that would start in
2012, and is also exploring ways to link its system with those in several other
western states and Canadian provinces through the Western Climate
Initiative (WCI). 40 All of these emerging compliance markets are developing
their own rules, while exploring various possibilities for linkage with other
existing and emerging markets. 4' Given the differences between these
systems, however, it is unclear whether and how they will link to other

35 See Questions & Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System (Dec. 17,
2008), available at http://www.travellingeuets.com/@api/deki/fiMesf78/=Memo_08-796_REVISED
_-_clean.pdf (providing overview of EU ETS and revisions for the Phase III period (post-2012))
[hereinafter European Comm'n Memorandum]; see also ELLERMAN & JoSKow, supra note 35, at 1
(noting that the EU ETS is expected to endure independent from any existing or future
international climate agreements).
36 European Comm'n Memorandum, supranote 35.
37 Id. CERs and ERUs are only allowed for certain activities, pursuant to the so-called
linking directive. See Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the. Council of
27 October 2004 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, in Respect of the Kyoto Protocol's Project
Mechanisms, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18-21.
38 See Government of Alberta, GreenhouseGas Reduction Program - Albert Environmen4
http://environment.alberta.ca/01838.htrml (last visited Nov. 17, 2010); NEW SOUTH WALES
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION SCHEME, INTRODUCTION TO THE GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION

SCHEME (GGAS) (2010), availableathttp'//greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/documents/Intro-GGAS.pdf.
39 See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS. INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO, BUDGET TRADING
PROGRAM (2010), available at http://rggi.org/docs/program-summary-10-07.pdf;
Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Welcome, http://rggi.org/home (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (identifying
the ten northeastern and mid-Atlantic states participating in RGGI).
40 See Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); CAL AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE
SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE at ES-I (2008); CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED
REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Appendix A. Proposed
Regulation Order (Oct. 28, 2010); WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI REGIONAL
PROGRAM at 1-2, DD-2 (2010).
41 See Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging
International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 790-91 (2009) (discussing
various linkage options).
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Kyoto compliance markets, such as the EU ETS, and to flexibility
mechanisms, such as the CDM.
In sum, the compliance carbon markets are quite fragmented with a
range of different sellers, buyers, units, and rules. Given the lack of progress
toward a post-2012 international agreement, such fragmentation will likely
continue for some time. In all of these compliance markets, however, the
buyers of compliance units are interested primarily in satisfying their
regulatory obligations. They are interested, in other words, in buying
compliance-or so one would think.
Ill. PROBLEMS IN THE CARBON MARKETS-HOT AIR AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY

The overarching policy concern regarding a compliance carbon market
is whether it will function in a manner that actually reduces emissions. In
the Kyoto context, this concern has been apparent from the very beginning,
2
and has led to more than a few calls for abandoning the whole effort. Two
issues in particular have dominated the discussions surrounding Kyoto's
environmental performance. First, there has been a long-standing concern
since the late 1990s that the 1990 Kyoto baseline 1 would result in substantial
AAUs going to the former economies in transition, who would then sell them
to other Annex B countries such as Japan or certain EU member states,
allowing these countries to cover their compliance obligations with surplus
AAUs rather than through actual emissions reductions." "Hot air" was the
term coined by environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fund,
Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth shortly after Kyoto was adopted in
4
order to bring attention to this supposed "loophole" under the Protocol.
The environmental community thus saw this as a major defect of Kyoto, and

42 See Sergio Abranches, Why We Should Abandon the Kyoto Protocol and Aim Higher,
http://www.ecopolity.com/2009/10/09/Why-we-should-abandon-the-kyoto-protocol-and-aim-higher/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2010); SCOTT BARRETT, CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS RECONSIDERED 2-3
(2008) available at http://www.policy-network.netuploadedFles/Publications/Publications/
ScottBarrett.pdf; Christina K Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy,30 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L.
REv. 411,411 (2007).
43 The Kyoto Protocol allows Annex I Parties "undergoing the process of transition to a
market economy" to choose a baseline other than 1990. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 3; art. 3, 5. Annex I Parties with a base
year other than 1990 are Bulgaria (1988), Hungary (average of 1985-1987), Poland (1988),
Romania (1989), Slovenia (1986). U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva,
Switz., July 8-19, 1996, Action Taken by the Conference of the Partiesat Its Second Session,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (Oct. 29, 1996).
44 In other words, setting the baseline for emissions reductions at 1990 meant that the
Soviet Union and its Eastern and Central European allies were effectively given a subsidy for
joining the treaty because their economies collapsed after that date and produced fewer
emissions than their AAU allocations. See David G. Victor et al., The Kyoto ProtocolEmission
Allocations: Windfall Surplusesfor Russiaand Ukraine,49 CLIMATIC CHANGE 263, 263 (2001).
45 See Kokorin, supra note 6, at 2. The problem only got worse when it became clear that.
the United States, the largest potential source of demand for Kyoto units of any type, was never
going to ratify the Protocol. Id
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mounted a campaign to limit the use of such hot air during the first
commitment period.40 Several nations responded to these concerns with
public commitments that they would not use hot air to meet their Kyoto
compliance obligations.
The second major concern regarding Kyoto's environmental
performance has been the failure of the CDM program to drive investment to
projects that satisfy basic additionality requirements (i.e., achieving
reductions that are additional to what would happen under the business as
usual scenario) and promote sustainable development.4 The CDM has thus
had its own version of the hot air problem. This has been most apparent in
the context of large industrial gas destruction projects.4 9 Because of the large
global warming potential (GWP) of certain industrial gases such as
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),n much of the early investment in CDM focused
on projects intended to destroy such gases Indeed, the majority of CERs
that have been issued to date have gone to these projects. By the end of
2009, HFC destruction projects, most of which have been in China,
accounted for about fifty percent of the total supply of issued CERs.5'
Evidence suggests that many of these projects were not additional; that
is, these were existing projects that were simply relabeled as CDM projects

46 See Michele Betsill, EnvironmentalNGOs Meet the Sovereign State: The Kyoto Protocol
Negotiationson Global Climate Change, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. & POL'Y 49, 57 (2002).
47 See, e.g., Jeremy van Loon, Canada Won't Buy Carbon Credits to Meet Kyoto Treaty

Targets, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 10, 2008, .available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aKE4068FTC4.
48 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
supra note 3, art. 12 (establishing the CDM, which requires the promotion of sustainable
development). But the CDM Executive Board has not developed any sort of formal requirement
that particular projects deliver sustainability benefits. See U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, A
REFORMED

CDM

- INCLUDING NEW MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

47-48 (Karen

Holm Olsen & Jorgen Fenhann eds., 2008).
49 A number of commentators have raised concerns about the "additionality" and lack of
sustainable development benefits associated with these industrial gas destruction projects. See,

e.g., Michael Wara, Measuringthe Clean Development Mechanism "sPerformanceandPotent'al,

55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1778, 1795 (2008).
50 HFC-23 has a GWP of 11,700, which means that the warming potential of 1 ton of HFC-23
is equivalent to .that from 11,700 tons of CO2. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Technical Summary 22, tbl.4 (J.T. Houghton,

G.J. Jenkins & J.J. Ephraums eds., 1990) (providing. GWPs for various greenhouse gases
including HFC-23). Thus, an HFC-23 gas destruction project under the CDM that destroys 100
tons of HFC-23 could generate up to 1,170,000 tons of reductions or 1.17 million CERs. The
GWP concept itself is not without problems, but has come to provide a key component of the
technical foundation for the Kyoto Protocol's embrace of a multi-gas compliance system. See,

e.g., Keith P. Shine, The Global Warming Potential The Need for an InterdisciplinaryRetria, 96

CLIMATIC CHANGE 467, 467 (2009) (discussing problems of using GWPs as a basis for comparing

the climate impacts of different GHGs).
51 See Andrew Allan, EU Signals ttFC 23 CER Ban: Repo4 POINT CARBON, Oct. 26, 2010,
availableathttp://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1482070.

2011]

CURIOUS CASE OFGREENING

in order to take advantage of carbon finance.12 Such projects have also been
heavily criticized because of the "windfall" profits they generated for certain
project developers and host country governments as well as their very
limited contribution to sustainable development. 3 In both the AAU and the
CER markets, significant and very legitimate concerns have been raised that
excess AAUs and low-quality CERs will flood the Kyoto markets and thus
undermine the environmental integrity of the whole effort.
IV. LESSONS FROM OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS

There are two basic types of regulatory environmental markets: capand-trade markets and offset markets. In cap-and-trade markets, property
rights are created in the form of use, emission, or extraction rights-for
example, the right to graze in a certain area,M emit a ton of suffer oxides
(SO,) , or catch a lobster.6 These trading systems use the market to make
prescriptive regulation more efficient. The government decides how much of
a harmful activity to permit (such as pollution or fishery catch), awards
private rights to engage in the activity up to the regulatory cap, and then
permits those rights to be traded. The market does not play a role in
determining the level of environmental protection; that is the role of the
regulatory regime.
If the cap is set appropriately, marketable permits should, in theory,
achieve the same level of protection as command-and-control alternatives at
a lower cost. 7 The net result allows the regulated community to select
appropriate control strategies and encourages innovative practices and
technologies. In all of the cap-and-trade programs with which we are
6
familiar-including the Clean Air Act's SOx, CFC,58 lead, 0 nitrogen oxides
52 See, e.g., Wara supranote 49, at 1787 ("[C]ircumstantial evidence suggests that, rather than
building new plants, HCFC-22 manufacturers elected to add capacity at existing plants during the
CDM baseline period in order to take advantage of the CDM subsidy." (footnote omitted)).
53 Id. at 1788-89.
54 See Berjamin M. Granig, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Offsets from Agriculture:
Opportunitiesand Challenges,in NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 21:
ADAPTING AGRICULTURE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 179, 181-82 (Allan Eaglesham & Ralph W.F.
Hardy eds., 2010), available at http://nabc.cals.comell.edu/pubs/nabc_21NABC21_Module4_
Gramig.pdf.
55 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, SO, Reductions and Allowance Trading Under the Acid Rain
2
Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/s0 .htnil (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
56 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 16, at 607, 616.
57 Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333, 1341-42 (1985). See generally Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad,
Presciptive Environmental Regulations Versus Market-Based Incentives, in MOVING TO
MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 3, 3-15
(Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) (reviewing lessons from experiences with
environmental compliance markets); Ackerman & Stewart, supra at 1341-47 (discussing merits
of emissions trading relative to command-and-control regulation).
58 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2006).
59 Id.§ 7671f.
60 See OFFICE OF POL'Y, ECON., AND INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE UNITED
STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 86-87
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(NOx), 6' and proposed Clean Air Interstate Rule 6 2 trading schemes; individual
transferable quotas for fisheries; and grazing rights-there has been no
differentiation within the currency of trade. In other words, in none of these
markets has a buyer expressed a preference for a "greener" subgroup of the
commodity. To coal-fired utilities, a credit for a ton of reduced SO X is all that
is needed. So long as the credit satisfies the regulatory compliance
requirement, all's well. Whether the credits came from "clean" or "dirty"
operations, sustainable or unsustainable, is immaterial.
The same is true for offset markets. In these markets, trades take place
in the context of permitting exactions and mitigation conditions. The
government authority conditions the granting of a permit to develop or
destroy habitat on agreement by the party to provide some environmental
value in return, such as open space or preserved habitat. Wetlands
mitigation banking and endangered species banking are the best-known
examples of these types of markets. In wetlands mitigation markets, the
effective trade is habitat destroyed in exchange for other habitat conserved,
generally larger in size.3 The permittee is responsible for finding the other
conserved habitat purchased either on the open real estate market or from a
so-called mitigation "bank," which has conserved habitat for the express
purpose of selling it to persons in need of such mitigation values. 4 In either
case, destroyed habitat is swapped for conserved habitat often with the
person seeking the permit largely in control of which lands are traded."'
As with cap-and-trade, there has been no market differentiation in
offset markets. Buyers simply want to satisfy their regulatory requirements.
They have no concern for the quality of the credits so long as the mitigation
banks are certified. They have little or no interest in the specifics of how the
credits have been generated. Indeed, this lack of concern over the quality of
mitigation credits so long as they satisfy compliance requirements has led to
real problems. The early history of wetlands banking was rife with failed
mitigation projects." The wetlands vegetation planted prior to official
inspection may have looked good enough for release of credits and issuance
of the 404 permit, 7 but the lack of subsequent oversight failed to uncover
(2001), available at http://yosenite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B-13.pdf/$fie/EE0216B-13.pdf.
61 NO. Budget Trading Program for State Implementation Plans, 40 C.F.R. pt. 96 (2010).
62 Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,210 (proposed Aug. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52,
72, 78, and 97).
63 See MARK LANDRY ET AL, APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM WETLANDS MITIGATION
BANKING TO WATER QUALITY TRADING 4-5, 7 (2005), availableathttp://www.ei.orgpdffwqtfomm
LanSiemStedShabO.pdf.
64 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2009);
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Mitigation Banking Factsheet, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands
facts/fact6.html (last visited Feb. 13. 2011).
65 See 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2009).
66 Eg, Roy R. Lewis, Wny FoidaNeeds Mitigaton Banking, 14 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL,
Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 7.
67 Section 404 permits are issued by the Secretary of the Army if, after public notice and
comment, the Secretary determines that the dredged or fill material will only cause a "minimal
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that such "cosmetic mitigation" projects failed more often than they
succeeded.B In a compliance mitigation market, the supervising government
authority is the only party that actually cares about quality, and it must
carefully oversee transactions or poor quality mitigation will follow.
A further type of environmental market exists within the larger
voluntary marketplace. These markets are driven by environmentally
concerned consumers. For example, consumer concern over ozone
depletion led progressive aerosol producers in the late 1970s to identify
some of their products with "CFC-free" labels, well before any government
regulation for these compounds.n In the produce market well into the 1990s,
a plethora of "organic" labels bedeviled consumers who sought vegetables
grown without pesticides or milk from cows who had not been given
hormones.7 ° The labels, however, did not disclose the specific standards for
certification. 7 1 One of the best-known problems with such loose "eco-labels"
was General Motors' bold marketing claim for its sport utility vehicle as
"environmentally friendly" because it had a CFC-free air conditioner..
In such a setting, a predictable pattern emerged. Amidst the noise of
multiple labels and standards, confused consumers turned to trusted
information intermediaries. Consumer Reports has served this role for many
types of products, 73 and a number of intermediaries have emerged to provide
information on the green credentials of various types of products and their
supply chains.74 Eventually, the government steps in-hence the guidelines
for environmental marketing promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission
or the federal Organic standard developed by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture after a record number of public comments.75

adverse environmental effect." Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
Alternatively, a State can issue 404 permits if it has an authorized program. Id. § 1344(g).

68 James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, "NoNet Loss": Instrument Choicein Wetlands Protection,in
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION,

supranote 57, at 323, 326.

See Rodney Dobell et al., Implementation in the Management of GlobalEnvironmental
Risks, in 2 LEARNING TO MANAGE ENVIRONMENTAL RIsKs 115, 124-26 (The Social Learning
69

Group ed., 2001) (describing the development of consumer concerns over CFCs and
subsequent legislation).
70 See generallyNational Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,663-65 (Dec. 21, 2000)
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) (describing the growth in the organic market, the patchwork of
private and state certification standards that developed prior to the promulgation of national
rules, and the difficulty consumers had verifying "organic" label claims).
71 See generally id. at 80,664 (identifying variation in certification standards and state
labeling requirements).
72 See generally Greenpeace, Gas-Friendly to Gas-Free? GM's Attempt to Greenwash Its
Image, http://stopgreenwash.org/casestudy-gm (last visited Feb. 13. 2011) (describing General
Motors' advertisements of its Chevrolet line of vehicles in 2007 focusing on the company's
efforts to be more environmentally friendly, such as through increasing vehicle fuel efficiency).
73 Consumer Reports, Our Mission, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/missionL/
overview/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
74 See, e.g., Good Guide, Good Guide, http//:www.goodguide.com (last visited Feb. 13,
2011); see also Minneti, supra note 9, at 48; James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the
Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1263-65 (1997).
75 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6503 (2006).
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V. GREEN DIFFERENTIATION IN THE KYOTO MARKETS

Given the environmental market experiences described in Part IV, we
would expect to see something similar in the carbon markets-that is, no
green differentiation among compliance credits. Indeed, the wetlands
experience suggests we might expect to see evidence of Gresham's Law,
where the cheapest (and simplest) currency tends to dominate as the
medium for exchange."6
In the voluntary carbon markets, by contrast, where buyers care about
the environmental integrity of the asset and in the absence of a regulatory
authority to guarantee such quality, we would expect to see information
intermediaries such as standards organizations stepping in to provide
labeling, certification, and other services to provide some assurances to the
buyers that the asset meets certain quality requirements. This appears to be
happening, as evidenced by the proliferation of voluntary offset standards.77
In the compliance markets, on the other hand, those purchasing credits
should be indifferent to the actual quality of the credits, so long as they
satisfy the regulators. Voluntary differentiation or greening, in other words,
is something we expect to see in the voluntary carbon markets but not in the
compliance markets.
In fact, however, we are seeing examples of voluntary greening in the
Kyoto markets for AAUs and CERs, likely as a response to some of the
environmental integrity concerns discussed above.78 This is a curious
development. As suggested, from a rational economic actor perspective, one
would expect that the buyers in a compliance market, whoever they may be,
would be interested only in buying compliance. Once the credits are issued
by the relevant regulatory authority, the question of their underlying
environmental integrity or quality should not matter to the buyer, whose
only aim should be to acquire enough credits to satisfy compliance
obligations. There is no need for a premium currency, in other words,
because the only characteristic of the asset that matters in these markets is
whether the unit in question counts toward compliance. But in both the AAU
market and the CER market, we are seeing efforts to "green" the compliance
units through voluntary programs and labeling schemes that seek to assure
buyers of the underlying environmental integrity of the credits.
A. Green AAUs
Greening is happening in the AAU market through the so-called Green
Investment Schemes (GIS) mentioned in the Introduction. These GIS
programs are self-imposed commitments on the part of certain central and
eastern European countries (former "economies in transition"), selling
excess AAUs to use the income generated from such sales for specific
76 See Fetter, supra note 16, at 480.
77 See ANJA KoLLMUSS ET AL., supra note 27, at 141-205 (reviewing different voluntary
offset standards).
78 See supra Part II.
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activities that will reduce emissions!" Through such schemes, purchased
AAUs become linked to specific GHG reduction efforts, providing a means
of squeezing some of the hot air out of the system.'
Two types of GIS schemes seem to be emerging. "Hard Greening" refers
to funded activities that can deliver measurable and quantifiable emission
reduction units.8 ' This looks a lot like JI (though without the formal
certification processes) and includes equipment upgrades, energy efficient
investments, etc. Ideally, the ratio of GHG emission reductions from hard
greening to emission reduction credits transferred approximates 1:1. "Soft
greening" refers to activities that have nonquantifiable and nonmeasurable
emission reductions, such as capacity building or awareness raising.8 While
hard to quantify, the ratio of GHG emission reductions from soft greening
GIS to emission reduction credits would likely be less than 1:1.
The AAU market is nascent and still developing. In 2009, the total value
of AAU deals was around two billion dollars, with a volume of one hundred
fifty-five million tons-a seven-fold increase over the prior year.n These
were typically large, bilateral deals, most of which were subject to some
type of greening.4 Buyers include a few European governments (primarily
Spain and Belgium), the government of Japan, and large Japanese
companies.m To date, Ukraine and the Czech Republic have been the largest
sellers of green AAUs.
The key point is that GIS is not mandated by the Kyoto Protocol, and is
not something one would expect in a compliance market. This is an entirely
voluntary creation with no accepted international rules or standards for
what should or should not count as an acceptable GIS.87 The very flexibility
of GIS also creates uncertainty because the environmental integrity of
projects will be harder to assure without robust international legal and
institutional monitoring, reporting, and verification frameworks designated
for this purpose.m
79 See BLX'H & BARON, supranote 6, at 7; KOKORIN, supranote 6, at 2-4, 7-8.
80 See KOKORIN, supra note 6, at 4.
81 Tuerk et al., supra note 5, at 3 (citing BLYTH & BARON, supra note 6); KARAN CAPOOR &
PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2009 at

56,

available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State-and_
Trendsof the CarbonMarket_2009-FINALb.pdf.
82 Andreas Tuerk et al., supra note 5, at 3 (citing BLYTH & BARON, supra note 6); CAPOOR &
AMBROSI, supra note 81 at 56.
83 CAPOOR & AMBROSI, supranote 81, at 56.
84 See id at 56. Most deals were reportedly signed at a price of €10 per ton. Id.
85 Id at 24, 54-56. Japanese companies are allowed to use AAUs to comply with Japan's
voluntary domestic GHG reduction targets.
86 Id.at 56.
87 AAU purchase agreements appear to be customized, bilateral deals, which are not
publicly available.
88 See, e.g., Szabo, supra note 1 (quoting Lajos Olah, State Secretary for Hungary's
Ministry
of Environment and Water, as saying, "The spending of the proceeds will be audited, in this way
the buyers can check how their money is spent."). Since Olah made this statement, however,
Hungary has been the target of criticism for failing to spend the proceeds of its AAU sales. on
environmental initiatives under its GIS framework. Green Gas, "Green Investment Schemes"
Grow. But Are They Green? MONTHLY CARBON REPORT (Aug. 2009), available
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B. The CDM GoldStandard
In the CDM market, several voluntary standards have emerged in an
effort to differentiate "premium" CERs from the rest of the market.' The
most prominent of these is the Gold Standard, which was established under
the leadership of the World Wildlife Fund for the purpose of certifying high
quality carbon offsets with demonstrated sustainability cobenefits in both
the voluntary and compliance markets. 90
The Gold Standard applies to a narrow range of projects in the
renewable energy and energy efficiency fields on the theory that these sorts
of projects are far more important than other. types of offset projects (e.g.,
industrial gas destruction projects) in encouraging the transition to a lowcarbon energy system." The Gold Standard has a specific set of rules
regarding special additionality tests, sustainability assessments, and public
consultations, and a separate registry that records and tracks the specific
CERs that are issued to Gold Standard certified CDM projects."
In 2007, the first CERs were issued by the CDM Executive Board for a
Gold Standard certified CDM project.93 Since that time, around 350,000 Gold
Standard CERs have been issued for some 20 projects, with additional

athttp://greengas.net/files/Carbon%2Report%2OAug%202009(l).pdf. As a result, several pending
deals for Hungarian AAUs collapsed. See, Marton Kruppa, Hungary Loses 6500m After GIS
Fiddle, POINT CARBON, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/
1.1298726 (reporting on collapsed AAU deals after report document Hungary's use of AAU sales
proceeds to deal with budgetary shortfalls).
89 See, e.g., CLIMATE, CMTY. & BIODIVERsrrY ALLIANCE, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY

PRoJEcT DESIGN STANDARDS 6-7 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.climate-standards.org/
standards/pdf/ccb standardssecondeditiondecember_2008.pdf; The Gold Standard, Gold
Standard FAQs: Certification and Marketing of Gold Standard Carbon Credits,
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/Gold-Standard-FAQs.194.0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011);
see also Adrian Muller, Risk Management in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) - The
Potentialof SustainabilityLabels, in ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS,
MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION 193, 201-02 (Bernd Hansjirgens & Ralf Antes eds., 2008); Patrick
Nussbaumer, On the Contributioni of Labeled Certitied Emission Reductions to Sustainable
Development: A Multi-CriteriaEvaluation of CDMProjects,37 ENERGY POLICY 91, 92 (2009).
90 The Gold Standard CDM standard was launched in 2003. See THE GOLD STANDARD, GOLD
STANDARD: THE BENCHMARK FOR QUALITY IN CARBON MARKETS (2009), available at
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/flleadminieditors/ffles/1_conmunication/flyer/Gold-Standard
-flyer 2009.pdf. A Gold Standard for the voluntary markets was issued in 2006. Id.
91 Press Release, Gold Standard Foundation, supra note 8, at 1; see also Levin et al., supra
note 8, at 784.
92 THE GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION, GOLD STANDARD REQUIREMENTS VERSION 2.1, at
12, 38, 39, 44 (2009), available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/6 GS
technical docs/GSv2./GSv2. IRequirements.pdf; see also Muller, supranote 89, at 202.
93 See Muller, supra note 89, at 202.
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projects in the pipeline.94 These Gold Standard CERs apparently trade at up
to a 25% premium over "regular" CERs.95
It is not entirely clear who is buying Gold Standard CERs, and some
portion of these are clearly being used in the voluntary markets to satisfy
corporate social responsibility pledges and other ethical investments.6 At
the same time, some entities regulated under the EU ETS have tendered
Gold Standard CERs for compliance purposes,17 and a number of
Governments have also purchased them.98 The Gold Standard organization
states that Gold Standard-certified credits
are in high demand due to the growing awareness about the need for rigor and
transparency in the carbon markets. They are preferred by a range of
government and private actors and fetch premium prices. Gold standard credits
have value in any policy environment, so companies feel safe with them
because they know their carbon investment will have value even if the policy
environment changes. 99

This suggests
hedge against
As with
under Kyoto

that Gold Standard CERs are being used at least in part as a
the fragmentation and uncertainty in the carbon markets.
green AAUs, however, there is no regulatory requirement
or any other compliance scheme that a covered entity,

94 Id. at 202. The Gold Standard maintains public registries that track Gold Standard
projects and certified credits for such projects. The registry listing Gold Standard CDM and JI
projects is available at https://gsl.apx.con/myModule/rpt/myrpt.asp?r=113. The registry
tracking certified Gold Standard CERs and ERUs is available at https://gsl.apx.com/myModule/
rpt/myrpt.asp?r=114.
95 The Gold Standard, Gold Standard FAQs, http://www.qdmgoldstandard.org/GoldStandard-FAQs.194.0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (click on "Gold Standard FAQs" and then
click on "Certification and Marketing of GS Carbon Credits").
96 See Eva Wuchold, Senior Project Manager, First Climate, Remarks at the Gold Standard
Third Annual Academy in Istanbul (Feb. 23, 2010) (presentation slides available at
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fleadmin/editors/files/1-cormmunication/academy/Academy2010_Presentations/Academy230210_EXTERNALEW-StinulatingDemand InAnEvolving_
CarbonMarketScenario.pdf);

see also KATHERINE

HAMILTON

FOUNDATION: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 2009 at

ET

AL.,

FORTIFYING

THE

94-95, avalable at http://www.

ecosystemnarketplace.com/documents/cms documents/StateOfrheVoluntaryCarbonMarkets2009.pdf.

97 See, e.g, Hauke Hermann et al., FREE ALLOCATION OF EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES AND CDMIJI
ETS: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES AND COMPANIES IN GERMANY 28
(2010) (discussing surrender of Gold Standard CERs by German companies to meet EU ETS
compliance obligations).
98 See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 96, at 92-93. Additional research is needed on the
identities and motivations of buyers of Gold Standard CERs. At least some portion of the Gold
Standard CERs that have been issued to date have been surrendered for compliance purposes
by covered entities under the EU ETS. See Mauro Fadda, Local Expert Central & South
America, The Gold Standard Foundation, Remarks at the Latin American Carbon Forum 2009 in
CREDITS WITHIN THE EU

Panama City, Panama (June 2009) (presentation slides available at http://www.latincarbon.com/
2009/docs/presentations/VoluntaryMarket&VERStandardsFadda.pdf); see also ROB ELSWORTH,
HYDRO CERs AND THE EU ETS 2009 4 (2010), available athttp://www.sandbag.org.uk/sitemedia/
pdfs/reports/HydroCERsandEUETS.pdf.
99 The Gold Standard, Gold Standard FAQs, http://cdmgoldstandard.org/Gold-StandardFaqs.194.0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
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whether a country under Kyoto or a private company under the EU ETS,
use premium CERs for compliance purposes. Taken together, these
examples of green differentiation in the compliance carbon markets are
unprecedented. They simply do not track the experiences in other
environmental compliance markets.
VI.

EXPLANATIONS-WHY

Is THIS HAPPENING?

If experience from other environmental compliance markets does not
predict green differentiation in the compliance carbon markets, then what's
going on? While more empirical research is needed to answer this
question, no one seems to be conducting this research or even asking the
question. To guide future work in this area, we suggest below a range of
possible explanations.
From a purely economic perspective, one might explain this as a simple
hedging strategy premised on the notion that "green" credits are more likely
to retain their value in future iterations of the carbon markets and therefore
warrant a premium today. Given the uncertainty associated with the post2012 process and the proliferation of various regional, national, and subnational markets, savvy buyers may be willing to pay more for green AAUs
and Gold Standard CERs today because they are more likely to hold their
value in the markets of tomorrow. This explanation suggests that the
identity of the buyers should not matter. In other words, one would expect
to see both governments and large corporate enterprises with multiple
potential compliance obligations in future markets active in the purchase of
green compliance credits. That does not appear to be the case, however,
given the dominance of governments as buyers of these creditsl °° Something
else must be going on.
A broader political economy explanation starts from the fact that
buyers of these green compliance units are primarily governments, and
views these purchases as responses to demands from important domestic
political constituencies. From this perspective, the market for green AAUs
and Gold Standard CERs is largely the result of political pressure brought to
bear on governments in Europe and Japan by environmental groups.'' By
paying a premium for higher quality "green" credits, these governments are
making good on promises not to use hot air for compliance purpose.'2
Among other things, this explanation suggests that one cannot understand
market dynamics without also understanding the identities and interests of
the buyers and their relationship to various constituencies.

100 See supraPart i.k
101 Part of the explanation for the green AAU market may also have to do with the
monopsonistic structure of the market. Given the large potential supply of AAUs relative to
demand, and the fact that there are only a small number of buyers, suppliers have little choice
but to create a new currency to address the specific quality demands of these buyers. This is
consistent with the underlying political economy explanation.
102 See supratext accompanying notes 47-48.
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A related explanation focuses on fiscal responsibility. Because the
buyers of these credits are primarily governments, it is appropriate to view
these purchases through the lens of public procuremenL In this explanation,
the decision to purchase premium green credits is largely a response to
possible criticism over purchases of hot air. Greened credits provide a
means of ensuring value and accountability for the expenditure of public
funds and improving the integrity of the system. Purchasing greened credits
provides a defense to charges of wasting taxpayer dollars.i 3
The final explanation focuses on governments as green consumers. In
this view, European and Japanese governments are genuinely concerned
about the environmental integrity of their purchases and the success of the
Kyoto framework. Buyers of green AAUs and Gold Standard CERs, in other
words, are truly interested in buying environmental integrity rather than
simply buying compliance: Because the standard AAU and CDM currencies
fail to capture adequately the environmental and sustainability cobenefits
that these Governments committed to under Kyoto, differentiated premium
green currencies are emerging to satisfy additional demands for quality. The
small number of major AAU buyers--essentially Japan and Western
European nations-accentuates this effect. Once they agree not to buy hot
air, suppliers have no choice but to create a new currency to address this
narrowed demand.
Part I noted that Belgium and Spain are not acting like rational
economic actors in their decisions to purchase green AAUs, but this
assumes that they actually should behave like rational economic actors. It
seems more likely that government buyers of Green AAUs (and some buyers
of Green CERs) are expressly not like buyers in the wetlands mitigation
banking or domestic emissions allowance markets."n To be sure, more
empirical research is needed to fully understand the dynamics of greening in
the Kyoto markets, but it is clear from this initial survey that the motivations
behind Government purchasing decisions are important drivers of this
greening and are not self-evident.
VII. LESSONS-DOES THIS MATTER?
The curious case of greening in the carbon markets may be just that-a
curious case, a temporary one-off development that will eventually give way
to more expected behavior as these markets grow and as regulatory
authorities adopt new rules to squeeze some of the hot air out of the system.
It's still early days. In a larger sense, however, the greening story matters

103 This explanation is also consistent with the recent decision by Japan and other potential
AAU buyers to pull out of large AAU deals with Hungary after it became apparent that the
Hungarian government had not managed the proceeds from prior AAU sales in accordance with
its GIS program. Kruppa, supra note 88 (reporting on collapsed AAU deals after report
documenting Hungary's use of AAU sales proceeds to deal with budgetary shortfalls).
104 One possible problem with this explanation, of course, is that the best way for these
governments to demonstrate environmental integrity is to make real reductions at home rather
than buy greened credits.
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because it highlights the importance of understanding the identity of the
buyers, their motivations, and the nature of the asset in the context of
emerging compliance markets. In the Kyoto markets, the identity of the
buyers is critical. Governments are the main buyers of green compliance
credits and are not acting like their private sector counterparts. While
environmental integrity does not typically matter in terms of compliance, it
matters greatly to domestic political constituencies. As a result, the standard
economic explanation of market behavior needs to be supplanted with a
political economy explanation.
This story also shows the importance of understanding the nature of the
asset and its ability (or lack thereof) to hold value. The global compliance
carbon markets are fraught with uncertainty and highly fragmented. Because
the future trajectory of the compliance markets remains unclear, the value
of AAUs and CERs in a future post-2012 market, not to mention those
emerging in other jurisdictions such as the United States, is not clear.
Greening thus provides a possible hedge against such uncertainty-a way of
ensuring that credits purchased today will hold their value in the future
under any policy environment, as the Gold Standard claims for its credits.
This suggests a dynamic process of market evolution. The structure and
rules of future markets may well be shaped by the lobbying of parties with
large holdings of greened credits, seeking to influence the political and
administrative processes and ensure their credits retain their value.
Greening also makes sense in a world of fragmented climate
governance marked by a series of loosely linked domestic and regional
compliance markets. Any attempt to generate fungible instruments that
can be accepted in multiple compliance systems will face significant
information demands. In the absence of a single regulatory authority to
impose uniform quality standards, and in the face of multiple credit issuing
bodies, voluntary qualification schemes such as GIS and the Gold Standard
could play an important role in providing the additional information
necessary for buyers to navigate this increasingly fragmented world.
Credible third-party certifiers assure market participants of the quality and
pedigree of the underlying asset.
As a result of these greening pressures, the Kyoto carbon markets have
not operated in accordance with Gresham's Law. If anything, the reverse
appears to be happening, as premium green currencies are emerging
alongside and, in some instances, driving out cheaper, standard currenciessomething that has never happened in other regulatory environmental
markets. This green differentiation is also fostering new opportunities in
emerging carbon markets. Thus, ongoing discussion regarding reform of the
CDM in the post-2012 period is focusing on many of the same concerns that
motivated the Gold Standard; namely, the need to incorporate sustainability
cobenefits into the program.' 5 The European Union's recent decision to ban
CERs from industrial gas projects in Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2020)
105 Mohamed T. EI-Ashry, An Overview of This Issue: Fmmework for a Post-Kyoto Climate
Change Agreement, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Winter 2008, at 2, 3; see also supra text
accompanying notes 90-91.
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can be seen as a recognition of the value of green differentiation based on
Gold Standard type quality criteria, a development that builds upon and
reinforces green differentiation dynamics in the CER market.la Similarly,
general proposals for sector-based offset programs in the design of
California and U.S. compliance systems and the recent initiative by the
Government of Japan to develop its own bilateral offset program also
greening strategies developed under GIS efforts
appear to be incorporating
01 7
and the Gold Standard.

These developments suggest an interesting thought experiment. The
greening stories we have described came on the back end, after the market
rules had been created. Consider, instead, what would happen if the
compliance markets expressly incorporated from the outset different
currencies (dark green, light green, brown) that sought to capture different
levels of quality regarding environmental and sustainability performance?'8
In other words, is there a way to design green differentiation into the
compliance markets from the outset in a manner that would facilitate a "race
to the top"-a flight to quality from the start? Much of this would depend, as
our analysis suggests, on the identity of the buyers and the role of civil
society in leveraging existing mechanisms for transparency and
accountability to push for high quality credits. Perhaps it would all collapse
as a result of too much complexity.' °9 But it seems to be happening on its
.106 See EU Bans IndustrialOffsets from 1 May 2013, POINTCARBON NEWS, Jan. 21, 2011, at 1
(discussing decision by EU climate change committee supporting European Commission
proposal to ban CERs generated from HFC-23 and adipic acid N20 projects); "Green" CERs
Valued at 90-Cent Premium, POINTCARBON NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, at 1-3 (discussing green
differentiation in the CER market in response to EU decision to ban HFC-23 credits including
the launch of new green CER contracts for the post-2012 EU ETS). In the European Parliament
debates regarding revisions to the post-2012 EU ETS, one of the committee proposals would
have permitted only "Gold Standard type" CERs and ERUs in the post-2012 phase. See Draft
Reporton the Proposalfor a Directive of the EuropeanParliamentand of the CouncilAmending
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance
TradingSystem of the Community, 26-27, 34 (Nov. 6, 2008).
107 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-ANDTRADE PROGRAM, Appendix A: Proposed Regulation Order §§ 95991-95994 (Oct. 28, 2010)
(establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits); CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED
REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Part I Vol. I, Staff Report:

Initial Statement of Reasons 11-48, 111-22 to 111-29 (Oct. 28, 2010) (elaborating on sector-based
offset program); Japan Adopts 15 "BilateralOffset Mechanism Projects," JAPAN TODAY,
Aug. 11, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/technology/view/japan-adopts-15-blateraloffset-mechanism-projects.
108This is already happening to some extent in various proposals to develop compliance
grade credits for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). See
William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental
law: Elements ofa Post-CopenhagenAssemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 457, 546 (2010) (discussing
efforts to accommodate various social and environmental safeguards in the effort to develop
compliance-grade REDD assets); BRIAN C. MURRAY, LYDIA P. OLANDER & DONALD P. KANAK,
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLY SOLUTIONS, FORGING A PATH FOR HIGH-QUALITY COMPLIANCE

REDD CREDITS 6 (2009), availableathttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/symposia
fcfs/2010-fcfs-briefing-materiais/murrayolander kanak.pdf.
109 Incorporating additional qualities and cobenefits into the currencies for compliance
carbon, for example, could prove to be a very challenging task.
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own. Would it not make more sense to learn from this unexpected
development and build it into market designs going forward?

VIII. CONCLUSION
Quality concerns have long been an issue in environmental marketsfrom wetlands mitigation banking to carbon. But such concerns have never
translated into any sort of differentiation among currencies in a compliance
context, until now. As this Article has demonstrated, green differentiation is
happening in the Kyoto compliance markets-a phenomenon we have
characterized as Gresham's Law in reverse. As with most things in -life, a
combination of various factors likely explains this curious case of greening
in the Kyoto markets. In our view, the most important factor driving this
phenomenon is the role of governments as buyers. This suggests that carbon
markets (and other environmental compliance markets) that place
governments in the position of buyers will likely not operate in the same
manner as other regulatory environmental markets. When governments are
major buyers, there are important factors at play beyond the cost of
compliance. In these circumstances, we should expect differentiation of
currencies to satisfy the different motives behind government purchasing
decisions. At a minimum, finding ways to harness green differentiation in
future carbon markets merits further research and focus on the design of
such markets.

